Optimal Capital Injections in a Microlending Group under External Shocks

Héctor Jasso-Fuentes, Alejandra Quintos, Xinta Yang

Abstract

Motivated by static models of group default in microlending, we study a dynamic problem in which the members of a lending group are exposed to external shocks, such as droughts or floods, and the manager of a common emergency fund decides at each shock how much capital to inject into the members who were hit. Shocks arrive at random times, the set of members that a shock hits may depend on which members the previous shock hit, and the losses may spill over to members who were not hit directly. Between shocks, the members' wealth follows a linear stochastic differential equation in which members support each other, and the fund grows with interest and member contributions up to a cap. The cost balances the members' shortfall below a poverty line, a welfare measure that contains a standard poverty measure as a special case, against the administrative cost of the injections and the benefit of keeping money in the fund. We formulate the problem as a Markov decision process embedded at the shock times and prove that the embedded process is Markov with a weakly continuous transition kernel. When the discount rate exceeds a growth rate determined by the wealth dynamics, we show that the expected total cost is finite under every policy, that the finite-horizon optimal values converge to the infinite-horizon one at an explicit rate, and that there exists a stationary optimal injection policy, which can be chosen independent of calendar time.

Source: arxiv · PDF

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